Using hand-collected biographical information on financial analysts from 1983 to 2011, we exploit their employment history and find that analysts with pre-analyst industry experience have significantly better forecast accuracy resulting in stronger market reactions when they forecast firms in industries similar to their previous industry experience. We also document that previous industry experience is positively related to favorable career outcomes-analysts possessing such experience are more likely to be named as Institutional Investor all-stars. This result is persistent pre-and post-Reg FD suggesting that industry expertise as opposed to social connections from previous employment is a more likely channel to explain our findings.
Does knowledge matter? Industry experience and analyst performance 1. Introduction
What makes a good sell-side financial analyst? A large body of academic research has been devoted to this question since sell-side analysts are one of the most important information agents in capital markets. The literature generally indicates that certain innate characteristics and external factors such as analysts' general forecasting experience, political views, portfolio complexity, and their brokerage house are related to analysts' performance (Clement, 1999; Gilson et al., 2001; Clement, Rees, and Swanson, 2003; Jiang, Kumar, and Law, 2013; etc.) .
Practitioners indicate that industry knowledge is perhaps the most important trait an analyst can possess. Each October, Institutional Investor (II) releases its annual all-star analyst rankings, which polls buy-side institutions and ranks the top sell-side analysts in each industry. In addition to a list of top analysts, the survey also reveals the qualities that respondents view as the most important.
Industry knowledge has consistently been ranked the number one trait. Corroborating II's poll, Brown, Call, Clement, and Sharpe (2013) survey sell-side analysts and they too believe that industry knowledge is the most important characteristic related to their performance and career concerns.
Despite the overwhelming view that industry knowledge is critical to an analyst's job, there is surprisingly very little systematic evidence examining the relation between industry knowledge and analyst performance-most likely because it is inherently difficult to measure.
A few papers have attempted to empirically address the link between analyst performance and industry specialization. Boni and Womack (2006) find that analysts have superior ability in ranking individual stocks within industries. Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2012) examine industry recommendations made by strategy analysts that take a macroeconomic top-down view of the overall industry. They find that a portfolio of optimistic industry recommendations earns significant positive abnormal returns while portfolios created based on negative industry recommendations earn negative abnormal returns.
In this paper, we aim to fill the void on the relation between industry knowledge and analyst performance by exploiting the pre-analyst employment experience of sell-side analysts using a novel hand-collected biographical dataset and examine whether this is related to forecasting performance.
Specifically, we extrapolate pre-analyst industry experience from their previous employment history and match this with analysts' coverage portfolios. This allows us to discern if a covered firm is related or unrelated to the analyst's pre-analyst industry work experience. We conjecture that industry knowledge acquired from pre-analyst industry work experience can provide sell-side analysts a competitive advantage by enabling them to better interpret the factors that have an economic impact on the operations, financial condition, and industry of the firms in their coverage portfolio above and beyond factors that have been previously found in the literature to be related to analyst performance. This should not only aid their forecasting performance, but also lead to favorable career outcomes.
To illustrate our empirical design, take one analyst in our sample. Before becoming an analyst, he worked at CBS Group for 7 years as a Director of Strategic Planning. In a given year, he was an analyst at Bear Stearns and the sample firms in his coverage portfolio included Cablevision Systems, Comcast Corporation, Cox Communications, Cox Radio, Young Broadcast, Walt Disney Corporation, and Adelphia Communications. These firms are in the entertainment/broadcasting industry and are related to his previous work experience at CBS Group. He also covers Hertz Corporation, The Learning Company, and Avis Rent A Car among others. These firms are unrelated to his previous work experience. To avoid confusion with analysts' general and firm-specific forecasting experience, we refer to pre-analyst work experience related to the industry of a covered firm as related experience. When these industry-experienced analysts make forecasts on firms operating in an industry that is unrelated to their pre-analyst industry experience, we refer to this experience as unrelated experience. Analysts without industry experience are called inexperienced or no experience analysts.
In our 1983 to 2011 sample of 112,973 earnings forecasts on 5,581 firms, we find that the relative earnings accuracy of forecasts issued by analysts with related experience is significantly higher than analysts with unrelated experience or no previous work experience. Specifically, the mean relative forecast accuracy of analysts with related industry experience is 3.58% higher compared to forecasts issued by other analysts after controlling for intertemporal variations in task difficulty, general and firm specific forecasting experience, and other factors shown in the analyst literature to explain cross-sectional differences in earnings forecast accuracy. Furthermore, relatedindustry experience has at least as large of an economic impact on forecast accuracy as any other documented analyst characteristic. On the other hand, the relative accuracy of forecasts issued by industry experienced analysts on unrelated firms is not different than those of inexperienced analysts.
We separate bold forecasts from herding forecasts using a similar method as in Clement and Tse (2005) to examine the types of forecasts for which the effect of related industry experience is most important. We find that related industry experience is associated with more accurate forecasts for both bold and herding forecasts. This result holds in subsamples sorted on Institutional Investor all-star status, the length of general forecast experience, brokerage house prestige, and analysts' affiliation with the firm. We also investigate improvements in firm-specific forecast accuracy across experienced and inexperienced analysts motivated by learning-by-doing models (Mikhail et al., 1997; Jacob et al., 1999; Clement and Tse, 2005) . We find significantly larger improvements in the forecast accuracy of experienced analysts on related firms than for unrelated firms or forecasts of inexperienced analysts. This finding suggests that sell-side analysts might have a steeper learning curve as a result of their superior industry knowledge gained from pre-analyst industry experience.
These results further support the view that industry knowledge is persistent, similar to other analyst characteristics found in previous work (e.g. Clement, 1999; Clement and Tse, 2003; and Malloy, 2005) .
Given the evidence of higher relative forecast accuracy, our next set of tests examine the extent to which pre-analyst work experience for sell-side analysts leads to favorable career outcomes.
Several papers show that accuracy is related to analysts' career concerns (Hong, Kubik and Solomon, 2000; Hong and Kubik, 2003) . Our evidence also supports this conjecture. We find that previous work experience incrementally increases the likelihood of becoming an Institutional Investor all-star analyst, but only when the analyst covers stocks related to her pre-analyst industry work experience.
Finally, we consider the variation in the market's assessment to earnings forecast revisions from industry experienced and inexperienced analysts. We consider not only the direction of forecast revisions, but also their magnitudes (Ivkovic and Jegadeesh, 2004) . We find that experienced analysts' upward and downward forecast revisions on related firms yield stronger market reactions relative to those of inexperienced analysts after controlling for various firm and analyst-level attributes. For instance, a one-standard deviation increase in the average upward (downward) earnings forecast revision by an analyst with related experience results in a 0.19% (0.29%) greater (lower) abnormal market reaction compared to forecasts of analyst with unrelated industry experience. By contrast, the short-term market reaction to forecast revisions of experienced analysts on unrelated firms is not different from those of inexperienced analysts. These findings are in line with the evidence regarding the pattern of relative forecast accuracy and show that analysts' industry knowledge brings valuable information to the capital markets through their earnings forecasts.
There are two likely channels through which industry knowledge can manifest itself in analysts' superior forecasting abilities. First, industry knowledge can be disseminated through a deep understanding of industry fundamentals, such as the impact of both macroeconomic and microeconomic factors such as changes in fiscal and monetary policy, political risk, and how each firm is positioned within the industry. Alternatively, an analyst might use his previous industry connections to gather private information. Cohen, Frazinni, and Malloy (2010) find that analysts with educational links to senior executives perform better than non-connected analysts, implying that these connections foster the transfer of private information. They further show that this effect vanished after Regulation FD (Reg FD), which prohibited selective disclosure by firm management to analysts. To determine which is a more likely conduit, we separate our sample into pre-and postReg FD periods. If industry connections vis-à-vis sharing private information is dominant, we would likely find the benefit of connections to be much weaker after post-Reg FD. However, we find that industry experience matters in both periods and the passage of Reg FD has not diminished the marginal impact of industry experience on forecast performance. This suggests that a fundamental understanding of the industry is a more likely explanation of value creation than industry connections. This result is also consistent with the strong emphasis buy-side institutions and sell-side analysts put on industry knowledge for forecasting performance in the post-Reg FD era (e.g. Brown, Call, Clement, and Sharpe, 2013) .
A potential concern with our analysis is that analysts that post information on LinkedIn.com, our main employment data source, might be systematically different from analysts that do not subscribe to this service. To deal with this issue, using the universe of I/B/E/S coverage, we test for systematic differences in forecast accuracy between both types of analysts (those that subscribe versus those that do not). We find no significant difference. Another plausible explanation for our results is that analysts simply exert more effort on their coverage of firms in which they possess related industry experience. To gauge effort, we investigate the number of earnings revisions made on portfolio firms (Jacob, Lys and Neale, 1999) . We find no differences between the number of forecast revisions made for firms where the analyst has related industry experience compared to that of firms where she does not. Finally, we eliminate all forecasts except those issued by analysts on industry-related firms. We find that the number of years of industry experience is also related to forecast accuracy.
Our paper illustrates the importance of industry knowledge and how this knowledge is disseminated through analysts' earnings forecasts. Our paper bridges the gap between what practitioners (i.e., buy-side institutions) claim is the most important analyst attribute and what we empirically find.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the motivation and relevant literature while section 3 describes the data and provides descriptive statistics. Sections 4 through 6 present the main empirical results. Section 4 reports evidence on forecast accuracy, section 5 provides results on career concerns, and section 6 presents market reaction results. Section 7 provides a discussion and robustness tests and section 8 concludes.
Motivation and literature review
A voluminous literature indicates that analysts bring valuable information to individual and institutional investors through their earnings forecasts, forecast revisions, and recommendations.
This value can be observed by investigating average market reactions to analysts' earnings and recommendation revision announcements (i.e., Womack, 1996; Gleason and Lee, 2003; Ivkovic and Jegadeesh, 2004; Livnat and Mendenhall, 2006; Bradley, Clarke, Lee and Orthanalai, 2013) . While the average analyst tends to provide valuable information to market participants, several papers show that not all sell-side analysts are equally skilled. Characteristics like brokerage house prestige, portfolio complexity, and political views have all been linked to analyst performance (Mikhail, Walther, and Willis, 1997; Clement, 1999; Gilson et al., 2001; Clement and Tse, 2003; Clement, Rees, and Swanson, 2003; Jiang, Kumar, and Law, 2013) . Several papers suggest that experience matters in the context of analyst forecasting performance. For instance, Mikhail et al. (1997) finds that analysts that cover a firm longer produce better forecasts implying a learning curve. Other papers suggest that general analyst experience translates into more accurate forecasts (Clement, 1999; Clement et al., 2007) . A related strand of literature indicates that geographical proximity to firms influences analysts' coverage decisions and results in better accuracy (Malloy, 2005; Bae, Stulz, and Tan, 2008; Tan and O'brien, 2012) . Du, Yu, and Yu (2013) find that cultural proximity, which is distinct from geographical proximity, improves processing of financial information and forecasting performance.
Perhaps to gauge the skills that are deemed the most important of financial analysts one should consider their primary customers, that is, the buy-side clients that they produce research for.
Each year, Institutional Investor (II) does just that. II polls buy-side institutions on who they believe are the top analysts in each industry. They also publish a list of qualities that buy-side clients believe makes a top analyst. In Appendix A, we supplement 
Data and descriptive statistics
The data used in this study is constructed from several sources. For each analyst remaining in the sample, we collect information on their pre-analyst employment. Our employment data source is LinkedIN.com, the world's largest professional network with more than 225 million members worldwide. We capture the names of all firms listed in their employment background, regardless if they are public or private firms. An analyst must have at least a year of non-analyst experience to be considered an experienced analyst. We then decompose the analysts' work experience into "related" and "unrelated" at the firm-level based on the analyst's experience relative to the firm followed. Specifically, we define experience as related if a previous employer and the followed firm shares 1 of 5 similar Fama-French industry classification codes, else we define previous experience as unrelated. Table 1 here*** We note two evident time series patterns shown in panel A. First, our ability to find reliable employment data for analysts is much lower in the early part of our sample and increases through time. For instance, before the 1993-1997 time period, we are able to use less than 10% of analyst earnings forecasts, but this rises to close to 50% in the last year of our sample. Second, the percentage of forecasts issued by analysts that have previous employment experience also rises through time (from about 1/3 to 3/4 of analysts). These time series patterns are likely due to the sharp increase in the use of online employment networks particularly among investment professionals in recent years.
Panel B of table 1 provides summary statistics on the main variables used throughout this paper. We follow the literature and construct our primary performance measure for relative earnings forecast accuracy as the proportional mean absolute forecast error (PMAFE i,j,t ) developed by Clement (1999) and widely adopted in the literature (i.e, Malloy, 2005; Clement et al., 2007; De Franco and Zhou, 2009; Horton and Serafeim, 2012; etc.) . Specifically, PMAFE i,j,t is defined as the difference between the absolute forecast error (AFE i,j,t ) of analyst i for firm j in time t and the mean absolute forecast error for firm j at time t. This difference is then scaled by the mean absolute forecast error for firm j at time t to reduce heteroskedasticity. PMAFE is the relative forecast accuracy for all analysts covering the same firm and thus controls for differences across companies, time and industry (Ke and Yu, 2006). As constructed, negative values of PMAFE i,j,t represent better than average performance, while positive values indicate worse than average performance. Formally, the proportional mean absolute forecast error is defined as:
where AFE ijt is the absolute forecast error for analyst i's forecast of firm j for year t, and MAFE jt is the mean absolute forecast error for firm j for year t. The lower the PMAFE value the more accurate the forecast.
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Following Clement (1999) and others, we include several proxies for analyst ability and experience. We report general and firm-specific forecasting experience, which are calculated as the total number of years that analyst i appeared in I/B/E/S (Gexp) and the total number of years since analyst i first provided an earnings forecast for firm j (Fexp), respectively. Clement (1999) shows that relative forecast errors are positively associated with the number of days between the forecast and announcement of actual earnings date, emphasizing the need to control for timeliness. Therefore, age is the number of days between the forecast and earnings date (Age). Portfolio complexity is 5 To account for outliers, we winsorize PMAFE at the 0.5% tails. The results are robust with or without winsorizing.
measured by the size of analyst's i' coverage portfolio (PortSize) and the number of 2 digit SICs followed by analyst i (SIC2). Resources available to analysts is controlled for by employment at large brokerage houses, which takes the value of 1 if analyst i works at a top decile brokerage house (Top10), zero otherwise. The left-hand columns in panel B present these unadjusted mean values.
The average absolute forecast error is 0.12, which is consistent with existing studies. The average analyst in our sample has been providing forecasts for 6.7 years, and covering the average firm in our sample for 2.8 years. The average number of days between forecasts and earnings announcements is 85.6. The average analyst covers 12.4 firms each year, which represents 3.5 The right-hand columns in panel B present mean-adjusted values. Clement (1998) finds that controlling for firm-year effects in dependent and independent variables improves the likelihood of identifying performance differences across sell-side analysts compared to a model that includes firm and year fixed effects. This is due to a firm's predictability of earnings changing over time.
Therefore, we follow the literature and adjust these variables by their related firm-year means in order to control for firm-year effects (Clement, 1999; Clement et al., 2007) . Appendix C provides a detailed discussion of how we compute these variables. Of course, subtracting mean values from raw values will drive the averages closer to zero, which is what we find.
Relative forecast accuracy and industry experience
In this section, we examine the forecast accuracy made by analysts with related industry experience compared to other analysts. We test the hypothesis that forecasts issued by these analysts are more accurate. As a starting point for our analysis, we examine univariate differences between earnings forecasts from analysts with related industry experience and forecasts by analysts with either unrelated experience or with no pre-analyst experience at all. In untabulated tests, the average PMAFE for related forecasts is -0.16 compared to unrelated forecasts or forecasts of inexperienced analysts at -0.09 and -0.12, respectively. A t-test assuming equal variances indicates that these differences are statistically significant indicating that analysts with related industry experience are more accurate forecasters. ***Insert Table 2 here*** Table 2 reports Pearson correlation coefficients between the main variables in the forecasting models. Each value is multiplied by 100. Earnings forecast errors are negatively correlated with pre-analyst work experience, however only when the forecast is made on a firm operating in an industry related to the analysts' previous work experience. Conversely, unrelated experience is positively correlated with forecast errors. Related and unrelated work experience are negatively correlated with analyst general and firm specific forecasting experience and portfolio complexity, and also positively correlated with brokerage size. With the exception of the correlation between general and firm-specific experience, the correlations are not exceptionally worrisome, particularly since they are mean-adjusted. These correlations are consistent with Clement (1999).
Baseline regression model for forecast accuracy
We employ a multivariate OLS regression model to formally test our first hypothesis that related industry experience will result in better forecast accuracy. 
***Insert Table 3 here*** Table 3 reports the regression results. Models 1-2 use the full sample of earnings forecasts.
Model 1 indicates that earnings forecasts issued by experienced analysts are relatively more accurate compared to those of analysts without pre-analyst work experience. Economically, analysts with previous employment experience issue earnings forecasts that are on average 1.55% more accurate.
Consistent with previous studies, analyst experience as measured by both analyst general and firmspecific forecasting experience results in more accurate forecasts, while busier analysts that cover more firms have poorer earnings forecasts. Analysts that work for more prestigious banks have better forecasts consistent with the view that have more resources available to them. The more analysts that cover a firm the more accurate are the earnings forecasts, which is likely due to a lower degree of asymmetric information for these more followed firms. In general, the coefficients on the control variables are consistent with the analyst earnings forecast literature.
In model 2 we decompose experience into its related and unrelated experience components.
The results suggest that only forecasts made by analysts with related industry experience produce more accurate forecasts. The coefficient on Related experience indicates that relative annual earnings forecast errors of experienced analysts on related firms are 3.58% (t=-6.76) more accurate compared to that of inexperienced analysts. On the other hand, experienced analysts' forecasts on unrelated firms are not more accurate than inexperienced analysts. Other control variables have generally similar coefficients as estimated in model 1.
In model 3, we restrict the sample to only experienced analysts that provide both related and unrelated forecasts. Thus, this particular estimation examines the ability of analysts with previous employment experience to forecast on companies in both related and unrelated industries. That is, analyst i makes forecasts on firms R and U, where R is related to her previous work experience and U is unrelated. The findings indicate that forecasts by analysts on related firms are 4.3% more accurate compared to forecasts on unrelated firms, on average. Taken together, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that industry experience improves forecasting performance of sellside analysts.
In models 4-9 we investigate the impact of previous analyst experience on bold versus herding forecasts. Several papers suggest that bold forecasts are more likely to reflect sell-side analysts' private information compared to herding forecasts (Hong, Kubik and Solomon, 2000; Clement and Tse, 2005) . Therefore, the impact of analyst work experience on earnings forecast accuracy might be more pronounced for bold forecasts if analysts use industry knowledge to their advantage. Bold forecasts are defined as earnings forecast revisions that are above/below both the consensus and the previous earnings forecast issued by the same analyst on the same firm (Gleason and Lee, 2003) . Herding forecasts are the complement to bold forecasts.
Similar to the results for the full sample in models 1-3, analysts with related industry experience produce more accurate earnings forecasts. These results provide further evidence that previous industry experience improves forecast performance regardless of boldness behavior.
Sorts by analysts characteristics
In this subsection, we sort on several analyst characteristics that have been shown to impact forecast accuracy to determine if industry expertise is a general effect or only impacts a subset of analysts. In particular, we focus on II all-stars (yes/no), overall analyst forecasting experience (above/below median), brokerage house prestige (yes/no), affiliation status (Affiliated/Unaffiliated), and two proxies for industry complexity (analyst has a PhD and firm is in a high-tech industry). 6 We estimate equation (3), but to conserve space, we only report the key experience coefficients. The results are presented in Table 4 . ***Insert emerge. We find that unrelated experience leads to worse forecast accuracy for presumably more skilled analysts (all-stars, more experienced, and top 10 broker). This may imply that more skilled analysts with prior success become overconfident in their abilities when making forecasts on firms in industries unrelated to their own experience (Hilary and Menzly, 2006) . These are generally consistent for bold and herding forecasts. Analysts that work at lower ranked brokerage houses seem to benefit from unrelated work experience, but only when they herd.
Analyst experience and learning curves
Learning-by-doing models suggest a positive relation between experience and task performance improvement. A number of studies have applied this model in the context of sell-side analysts and document that company-specific forecast experience yields improvements in forecast accuracy. In these models, the starting point of analysts' accumulation of experience is measured by general and company-specific experience (Mikhael et. al, 1997 (Mikhael et. al, , 2003 Jacob et al. 1999; Clement et al., 2007) . In our context, we examine if analysts' previous employment experience results in a steeper learning curve. In a similar fashion to Clement and Tse (2005), we measure the improvement in forecast accuracy as the difference between PMAFE for analyst i for firm j between year t and t-1.
All independent variables are measured as changes between t and t-1 as well. If experienced analysts increase their relative forecast accuracy at a faster rate relative to their non-experienced counterparts, the coefficient on Experience should be significantly negative. Like our previous analysis, we differentiate between related and unrelated experience and include similar control variables as in table 3. ***Insert Table 5 here***
The findings in Table 5 reveal a significant negative coefficient on related experience, suggesting that analysts with pre-analyst work experience show more improvement in their forecasting performance relative to inexperienced analysts. Results are robust for the full sample, and also for bold and herding forecasts. Other analyst characteristics are also associated with expected signs. For example, analysts with lower initial forecast performance, higher companyspecific forecasting experience, and analysts working for high-status brokerage houses are associated with larger improvements in forecasting performance.
Overall, the results in section 4 paint a very clear picture. Analysts with pre-analyst work experience in a related industry as firms in their coverage portfolio make more accurate earnings forecasts and have a steeper learning curve, on average. This effect is pervasive. It is present in earnings forecasts that are considered bold or herding and holds after controlling for other known analyst characteristics previously shown to influence analyst forecasting accuracy. Economically, it is just as large as these other known important influences.
Experience and career concerns
We have demonstrated that previous industry experience aids in analysts' abilities to forecast earnings. As Hong and Kubik (2003) 
***Insert Table 6 here*** The first column in Table 6 suggests that analysts with industry work experience are more likely to become all-star analysts compared to inexperienced analysts from similar brokerage houses.
The odds ratio is 1.63, which implies that the odds of being elected an all-star analyst among analysts with previous industry experience is 63% higher than the odds among analysts without industry experience. All of the other control variables behave as expected and are consistent with the literature. For example, analysts with greater skill (i.e., more general experience, employed by higherstatus brokerage houses) and following larger firms are more likely to be selected all-stars. It is important to note that we also find that forecast accuracy is related to becoming an all-star, but industry experience is still statistically and economically relevant. Finally, the likelihood of becoming an all-star in year t+1, is correlated with being an all-star in year t.
7 One reason for the disparity in compensation between star and non-star analysts is because all-star analysts are instrumental in attracting investment banking deal flow (Clarke, Khorana, Patel, and Rau, 2007) . However, in 2003, the Global Research Settlement prohibited analyst compensation being tied to investment banking business. 8 Previous work has shown analysts working for larger and more reputable banks are more likely to be selected all-star members (Emery and Li, 2009; Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2010) . Therefore, we match each experienced analyst to a portfolio of inexperienced analysts based on the size quintile of their brokerage houses. Results are qualitatively similar with or without matching and when we use quartile matching.
We next decompose experienced analysts into related and unrelated based on the composition of their portfolios. Specifically, we define an experienced analyst if they follow at least 1 firm operating in a related industry, else they are unrelated. In model 2, we document that experienced analysts following related firms are more likely to become all-stars compared to inexperienced analysts or experienced analysts following only unrelated firms. Finally, in model 3 we include only analysts with experience. Again, Related Experience is positive and significant.
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As an additional way to assess the impact of industry work experience on career outcomes, we also examine the probability of moving up to a more prestigious brokerage house. We reestimate equation 4, but the dependent variable is a binary variable that takes a value of one if the analyst is promoted to a more prestigious brokerage house, zero otherwise. In untabulated results, we find industry experience is important for movement to a top decile brokerage, but the result for related industry experience is weak. 
Stock price impact of experience on forecast revisions
Given our evidence of higher forecast accuracy for industry experienced analysts and a higher likelihood of being included in the II rankings, we next investigate the market reactions to forecast revisions issued by these analysts. If buy-side institutions value industry knowledge because they perceive it leads to superior forecasting skills, then it is plausible that institutions and other market participants are more likely to listen to analysts with previous industry experience. If so, the market reaction to these forecasts should be more pronounced.
Similar to the framework developed in Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004), we consider the direction as well as the magnitude of forecast revisions (FR) when examining the implications of pre-analyst experience for market reactions. We regress cumulative abnormal 3-day CRSP VWIndex adjusted returns on the interactions between the magnitude of forecast revisions and experienced binary variables, and then we compare the coefficients across these interactions. Our regression model also controls for a wide array of analyst and firm characteristics in equation (3) and 9 In model 3, we also restrict the sample to analysts that cover at least one firm related to their previous experience and compute the proportion of the analyst's coverage portfolio that is related to their industry experience. We continue to find a positive and significant relationship. 10 As pointed out to us, a junior research analyst at a top brokerage house moving down to a lower-level brokerage in a senior position may be considered a favorable career move thus making this test problematic. On the other hand, being included in the annual II all-star poll is unambiguously favorable.
includes year fixed effects with heteroskedasticity-robust and standard errors clustered at the firm and analyst level. Our model is as follows: Table 7 here*** and 0.29% larger market reaction to forecasts from analysts with industry experience compared to analysts with unrelated experience or no experience, respectively. The difference in market reactions between related analyst experience and unrelated or inexperienced forecasts are highly statistically significant at conventional levels. However, the difference in market reactions between experienced analysts in unrelated industries and inexperienced analysts is not (p-value = 0.26).
Model 3 is conditional on experienced analysts that provide both related and unrelated industry forecasts similar to table 3, model 3. Holding previous industry experience constant, market reactions are stronger for upward earnings forecasts when they coincide with an analyst's previous employment experience. On average, given a 1 standard deviation in forecast revisions, the market reaction is 0.20% higher for revisions made by an analyst on a firm that has previous related industry experience compared to forecast revisions by the same analysts that provide earnings forecasts on unrelated companies. Models 4-6 present results for downward revisions. Similar to the results for upward revisions, previous industry experience is important. In model 1, a 1 standard deviation change in downward revisions results in a -0.21% lower reaction (for downward revisions, 1 standard deviation from the mean equals 0.15). When we examine related and unrelated industries, we observe larger differences for downward revisions than upward revisions. For instance, in the conditional regression in model 6, the market reaction is -0.39% greater when an analyst provides a downward forecast on a related industry compared to when the same analyst provides a downward forecast on an unrelated industry. 
Discussion and robustness tests
We have documented that previous industry experience aids analysts in providing more accurate forecasts, is related to favorable career outcomes, and market reactions are higher for analysts possessing such experience. In this section, we explore potential channels through which industry experience manifests itself and provide additional robustness tests.
Channel through which industry experience is transmitted
We are interested in the channel through which previous industry experience permeates analysts' superior forecasting skills. There are two likely potential channels. First, analysts with previous industry experience likely have industry or social connections to management and other employees at their former job. Additionally, similar connections may exist up and down the supply chain and/or with former customers if the analyst had interactions outside of their firm. Through these social connections, analysts may be privy to soft or private information that is not easily accessible through normal channels. This may be the source of the analyst's superior forecasts.
Cohen, Frazinni, and Malloy (2010) find that analysts with school ties to senior executives perform better than non-connected analysts. They suggest that these connections promote the transfer of private information. In our context, the social connections made while working in the industry would foster these relationships. Table 8 here*** Table 8 presents the estimation of equation 3 pre-and post-Reg FD. We find that experience, driven by related industry experience is significantly related to forecast accuracy in both periods. This implies that industry knowledge through social connections is an unlikely explanation for our results. Rather, the channel through which industry knowledge is reflected in analyst forecasting is more likely related to a fundamental understanding of industry dynamics. It is worth noting that according to Appendix A, industry knowledge is just as important to buy-side institutions after as before Reg FD. Our results are at least consistent with this view. 
Industry classification
A legitimate concern with our analysis is that our industry classifications are based on broad Fama-French industry classifications. These concerns should be mitigated because our conditional models examine differences in forecasts by experienced analysts that provide forecasts on firms both related and unrelated to their previous employment experience. Further, misclassification will introduce noise and bias the results against us finding differences between analysts with and without industry experience. Nonetheless, we acknowledge this still may be a reasonable concern. To deal with this potential issue, we limit our sample to the 458 analysts that worked at publicly-traded firms before becoming an analyst. We then use the Global Industry Classification System (GICS) that classifies firms into 68 industries. Boni and Womack (2006) argue that the GICS system matches well with analyst industries. GICS classifications are also used in Kadan, Madureira, Wang and Zach (2012). ***Insert Table 9 here*** Table 9 estimates equation 3 with the sample of publicly-traded firms that can easily be assigned to GIC industries. We find the results are robust in this more restricted sample. Comparing the coefficients on Related experience from table 3 (model 3) to model 1, table 9, the economic magnitude is larger for this more restricted sample of publicly-available firms (-5.04 versus -4.33 ).
Thus, our classification system based on broad industries does not pose a problem for our analysis.
Self-selection and measurement of related industry experience
Another reasonable concern with our analysis is that analysts self-select to subscribe to
Linkedin.com. This may be a particular concern in the early part of our sample as our match rate with these sources is low. To deal with this concern, we perform two additional tests. First, we estimate equation (3) Table 10 here***
We have interpreted the results of our findings being consistent with the view that industry experience aids in analysts' performance because it provides them with a competitive advantage over their inexperienced peers. An alternative explanation is that analysts simply exert more effort on these firms because they believe they can forecast them better. With an asymmetric level of effort, it might explain why they forecast industry-related firms better. To gauge effort, we consider the number of revisions made on portfolio firms within a given year (Jacob, Lys and Neale, 1999 Model 4 is conditional on analysts forecasting industry-related firms only. The coefficient is -3.1, which implies a 0.63% improvement in relative forecast accuracy given a one year increase in related experience. This also confirms that our results are not driven by potential self-selection of analysts exerting more effort on companies related to their previous experience.
Alternative proxy for forecast accuracy
Throughout our paper, we adopt the widely-accepted measure of analyst forecast accuracy developed in Clement (1999). To ensure our results are robust, we also use the performance metric in Hong and Kubik (2003) . In this method, forecast errors are computed for each firm covered by an analyst. Analysts are then ranked based on this performance and a score between 0 and 100 is assigned to each analyst (see Table IV , page 322 in Hong and Kubik (2003) for a hypothetical example). Relative forecast accuracy is the average of all analyst i's scores over year t, t-1 and t-2. As
Hong and Kubik argue, this long 3-year average horizon should reduce noise and might be a more appropriate test for performance persistence.
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In untabulated analyses, we reestimate equation 3 substituting this new measure of relative forecast accuracy in place of PMAFE. Year, firm, and industry fixed effects are included in these models. Similar to the results found in Table 3 , we continue to find that analysts with related experience have significantly better forecast accuracy. Further, we also find that unrelated industry 14 We also consider if analysts with related industry experience are more likely to provide bold forecasts on their set of industry-related firms. We do not find evidence supporting this conjecture. 15 We also compute this measure over only year t and find similar results.
experience does not aid performance. Thus, our results are robust to this alternative measure of forecast accuracy.
Industry forecasting experience
It is known that analysts tend to specialize in industries, so it is likely that an analyst's industry forecasting experience is highly correlated with general experience (we find the correlation is 0.85). Nonetheless, we control for an analyst's industry forecasting experience by computing the number of years that each analyst provided forecasts in the same 2-digit industry as the forecasted firm. We estimate equation (3) and in untabulated results, we find that related pre-analyst experience is still highly significant (coefficient = -3.93, t-stat = -9.23).
Conclusion
Practitioners indicate that industry knowledge is consistently the most important quality a sell-side analyst can possess. Despite this anecdotal observation, surprisingly little empirical evidence has addressed how industry knowledge impacts analyst performance and career concerns. This paper attempts to fill this gap. Using novel biographical data on sell-side analysts, we exploit their previous employment history and examine how previous employment in related and unrelated industries influence earnings forecasts, career concerns, and market responses to earnings revisions.
In our sample of earnings forecasts from 1983 to 2011, we find that analyst forecasts are more accurate for analysts with previous industry experience. However, this is only true for analysts with experience in industries related to the firms they cover. Likewise, experienced analysts have a steeper learning curve. That is, their forecast accuracy improves at a faster rate compared to inexperienced analysts or analysts with unrelated experience. These results are robust after holding constant other known analyst characteristics linked to skill such as general and firm-specific forecasting experience, portfolio complexity, and working for a top brokerage house. We test if this superior performance is driven by social connections or fundamental knowledge of industry dynamics. Our results suggest that the latter is a more likely explanation.
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